Failing DPRs? J&K experts demand accountability in infrastructure planning

By: Nazia Hassan – Ziraat Times 

When Union Minister for Road Transport and Highways, Nitin Gadkari, admitted in July 2025 that “in India, the quality of Detailed Project Reports, called DPRs, prepared by consultancy firms is not good, it opened a window for public debate and discussion on a matter quite crucial for states like Jammu & Kashmir. Mr Gadkari went on to also acknowledge that contractors were also not doing a good job on some  infrastructure projects

His remarks, reported by The Economic Times, highlighted a long-brewing crisis in J&K’s infrastructure sector: poorly designed Detailed Project Reports (DPRs) leading to collapsing tunnels, caved-in highways and irreparable loss to people’s business, livelihoods and the larger economy here.

A DPR is supposed to be the foundation of every major development project, including road, tunnel, or bridge project — a blueprint that integrates technical, financial and logistical details.

If a DPR is poorly conceived, lacks the necessary details, risk analysis and mitigation plans, projects could fail miserably and cause immense loss to the state exchequer and citizens as a whole, experts maintain.

 The 16-day closure of NH-44 in Jammu & Kashmir, for instance, alone has caused an estimated ₹1,000 crore loss for Kashmir’s apple farmers, leaving truckloads of fruit and vegetables to rot and cutting off the Valley’s only lifeline.

And Mr Gadkari’s admission raises some uncomfortable questions in J&K’s context: Who screens and approves faulty DPRs in J&K? Why do implementing authorities like the NHAI fail to address the intrinsic risks, develop mitigation plans and detect glaring defects left by contractors? And who compensates citizens for the massive losses caused due to the bad work on public projects?

While natural disasters are inevitable, public infrastructure experts maintain that the key challenge before designers and implementors of public infrastructure projects is to anticipate those and imbed disaster risk reduction in the design and risk mitigation strategies.

Reacting to the minister’s  observations, Saleem Beg, former Director General of Tourism in J&K and convenor INTACH J&K Chapter, said the malaise was not in the rules but in bureaucratic culture.

“This is how it must be done ideally. But the whole system has got bureaucratised where nobody takes responsibility,” Beg remarked. “The rules are not a handicap. Competency and validated experience can be considered, provided someone is willing to do so. But passing the buck and playing safe has become the guiding principle  (in places like J&K).”

“A flawed system of consultants and approvals”

Iftikhar Drabu, an engineer and expert in large infrastructure design, believes the root of the crisis lies in weak expertise and flawed procurement.

“Firstly, we lack good consultants with real experience of designing in mountains, especially in young ranges like the Himalayas. Secondly, the government’s fixation on selecting consultants on the L1 basis is dangerous,” he explained. “Even though consultancy fees are barely 1–2% of project cost, agencies still prefer the lowest bidder. A competent consultant may cost slightly more, but in the end, he saves much more on project and maintenance costs.”

Drabu listed further systemic flaws: limited in-house capability of departments to monitor consultants, rushed timelines for DPR preparation that leave little room for proper geological investigations, and the reluctance of authorities to invest in extensive surveys. “Most of the time, people in authority overrule engineers’ advice and this results in badly compiled DPRs,” he said.

For Fayaz Khan, a US-based Kashmiri and critical water resilience planner, the problem is deeper than inefficiency.

“From my experience preparing state and national DPRs in India, the problem was never lack of talent. It was fraud, deception, and kickbacks,” Khan said. “DPRs were written to satisfy officials and secure payments, not to deliver sustainable outcomes. Data was manipulated, approvals pushed with informal incentives, and the result was glossy reports that collapsed in execution.”

He added that the system incentivises mediocrity: “DPR firms pocket around 7% of the project’s estimated budget whether the project is implemented or not. So the incentive is not to design sustainable solutions but to produce documents that get quick approvals. That’s why we see collapsing tunnels, failed conservation schemes, and wasted public money.”

Mian Javed Hussain, former Conservator of Forests in J&K, traced the failures to policy dilution and disregard for environmental safeguards.

“The dilution of the Forest Conservation Act over the last decade, poor workmanship, and minimum regard for environmental laws are key reasons behind such disasters,” Hussain noted. He contrasted current practices with the earlier days when the Border Roads Organization (BRO) maintained the Srinagar-Jammu highway. “BRO’s Project Beacon carried out operations with careful handling of slopes and ecology, braving all weather challenges. With private players now dominating, we see widespread environmental degradation and brutal neglect of conservation norms.”

Independent observer Asrar Mufti offered a blunt summary: “Lack of adequate checks and balances, rush to cut ribbons and cut corners, lack of expertise in mountainous terrain… the system needs an overhaul. I’m not sure if the minister’s pertinent observations will be followed through with systemic restructuring of the project approval process.”

While these voices paint a grim picture of systemic dysfunction — from poor consultant selection and inadequate geological studies, to corruption, ecological neglect and bureaucratic buck-passing, Union minsiter Gadkari’s acknowledgment may have opened the door for reform.

Concerned citizens in J&K believe that unless accountability is fixed within both consultancy firms and approving authorities, J&K  risks repeating the cycle of collapsed tunnels, heavy economic loss and wasted billions of financial resources.

For now, the unanswered question lingers: will the government’s promised penalties translate into real structural change, or will DPRs remain the weakest link in J&K’s infrastructure dreams?

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