A Kashmir-specific framework for disaster risk reduction, preparedness and resilience

By Mauzam Bakshi

Kashmir has always lived with disasters.

Earthquakes, floods, flash floods, landslides, avalanches, cloudbursts, heavy snowfall and severe windstorms are part of its geographical reality. But the risk does not arise from natural hazards alone. As infrastructure, transport, industry and urbanisation expand, Kashmir must also prepare for technological and human-induced emergencies.

Among all these risks, however, earthquakes and floods deserve the greatest attention because of their potential to affect large populations, critical infrastructure and essential services simultaneously.

The 2005 Uri earthquake should have been a defining lesson. It triggered workshops, seminars and discussions on earthquake-resistant construction, particularly the need for safer dwellings in mountainous regions and the retrofitting of vulnerable structures. More than two decades later, a fundamental question remains: how prepared are we for the next major disaster?

Seismologists, scientists and researchers including Professor Roger Bilham, have repeatedly drawn attention to the significant seismic potential of the Himalayan region. The possibility of a magnitude 8 or greater earthquake is not a prediction of when such an event will occur. It is a warning about the level of seismic risk that the Himalayan region, including Kashmir, must take seriously.

The question is therefore not whether we can predict the exact day of the next major earthquake, we cannot. The real issue is whether we are reducing its consequences before it happens.

Kashmir’s terrain makes disaster management fundamentally different from that of a plain region. Mountains, narrow transport corridors, river systems, dispersed settlements and difficult-to-access areas can turn a single emergency into a complex crisis.

A major earthquake could simultaneously damage buildings, roads, bridges, hospitals, electricity and communications. A flood could overwhelm settlements and transport corridors while disrupting essential services. A cloudburst could trigger flash floods and landslides. The disaster-management system must therefore be designed around Kashmir’s own geography, infrastructure and vulnerabilities. The emphasis must also move from responding after a disaster to reducing risk before it occurs.

Knowing the risk

The approach should begin with knowing the risk. Kashmir needs a continuously updated, location-specific disaster-risk atlas. Risk cannot be understood adequately through administrative boundaries alone. Earthquake vulnerability, floodplains, landslide susceptibility, avalanche zones, flash-flood channels, cloudburst-prone catchments and vulnerable infrastructure should be mapped according to terrain, elevation, geology, drainage and settlement patterns.

The same information should guide land-use planning, infrastructure investment, building permissions and emergency preparedness. A school, hospital, bridge or government facility located in a vulnerable area should be identified before an emergency exposes the weakness.

The risk atlas should also include technological and human-induced hazards such as hazardous-material storage, major fuel and LPG installations, industrial locations, railway infrastructure and other sites where an accident could have consequences beyond the immediate location.

Building safely

The second priority must be building safely. The lessons of the 2005 earthquake must become visible in Kashmir’s buildings. Building codes and seismic provisions are meaningful only when they are properly enforced. New construction, particularly in earthquake-prone and mountainous areas, requires appropriate structural and geotechnical scrutiny.

But the bigger challenge is existing infrastructure. Many buildings were constructed before today’s understanding of seismic risk became widespread. Government offices, schools, hospitals, bridges and other public facilities require systematic structural vulnerability assessments. Where necessary, they should be retrofitted rather than waiting for an earthquake to reveal their weaknesses.

Development should not create tomorrow’s disaster.

Is the Government itself disaster-ready?

This brings us to one of the most important issues in Kashmir’s disaster preparedness: the readiness of the Government itself.

The government is not simply one participant in disaster response. It is the principal authority responsible for coordinating rescue, relief, healthcare, essential services, communications, law and order and restoration of infrastructure. Government-owned infrastructure must therefore itself be capable of functioning during a disaster.

Government hospitals, for example, need structural assessments for major earthquakes as well as plans for mass casualties. Government schools, many of which may become temporary shelters, need structural safety assessments and emergency-use plans. Police stations, Fire and Emergency Services stations, district offices and emergency-control rooms must be capable of operating even when electricity and telecommunications fail. Critical government buildings require backup power, water, communications and alternative access. Essential government records and data also need protection against physical destruction and prolonged power or network failure.

Kashmir therefore needs a Government Critical Infrastructure Disaster Readiness Audit covering hospitals, health centres, schools, police and fire stations, emergency-control facilities, government offices, power installations, water-supply systems, bridges and other essential public assets.

Such an audit should go beyond establishing whether a building exists or equipment has been purchased. It must establish whether the facility can actually function during and immediately after a major disaster.

A hospital with a structurally vulnerable building is not disaster-ready. A control room without independent communications is not disaster-ready. Preparedness must be tested, documented and periodically reviewed. The government should know in advance which critical facilities will remain operational, which may become vulnerable and what contingency arrangements exist for each.

Keeping Kashmir connected

Access is another major Kashmir-specific challenge. After a major disaster, the first problem may not be the number of rescue teams available but whether they can reach the people who need them.

Strategic roads, bridges, tunnels and mountain routes should therefore be treated as critical disaster infrastructure. Major corridors need vulnerability assessments, alternative-route plans, emergency clearance arrangements and pre-positioned equipment.

Remote and mountain communities require particular attention because they may remain cut off considerably longer than urban areas. Emergency stocks of medicines, food, fuel and rescue equipment should be strategically distributed rather than concentrated only in major centres. Helicopter and air-support capacity should form part of contingency planning for areas that could become inaccessible.

No community should become completely dependent on a single road, bridge or communication link for survival.

Early warning and the last mile

Early warning is equally important. An effective warning is much more than a weather bulletin. People need to know what is expected, where it is expected, how serious it could be and what they should do.

Kashmir requires increasingly localised and impact-based warning systems because conditions vary sharply across its mountains, valleys and river catchments. A rainfall forecast does not automatically tell us what will happen in a particular settlement. Rainfall in an upstream catchment can create flooding downstream hours later.

Cloudbursts, in particular, have become a recurring phenomenon in Kashmir, often producing sudden flash floods, debris flows and landslides with little time for communities to react. Cloudbursts require particular attention because their very nature leaves little room for conventional response after the event begins.

Vulnerable catchments, steep channels, settlements along stream courses and areas repeatedly affected by debris flows should be identified in advance. Where technically feasible, localised monitoring, rainfall thresholds, automated alerts and community-level warning systems should be developed.

The objective must be to provide people with even a few critical minutes to move to safer ground, close vulnerable infrastructure or stop movement through dangerous channels and roads.

The same principle applies to severe windstorms. Strong winds can uproot trees, remove rooftops, bring down electricity poles and transmission lines, block roads and cause significant losses to orchards and standing crops. Even when casualties are relatively limited, the disruption to electricity, communications, transport and livelihoods can be considerable.

Warnings should therefore connect forecasts with expected impacts and practical actions. They must reach people through multiple channels, including mobile networks, radio, television, sirens, hooters, public-address systems and local administration.

The last mile is often the most important mile.

Communities as the first responders

When disaster strikes, the first responders are usually those already at the scene. Kashmir’s disaster system therefore needs strong local preparedness, particularly in remote and mountainous areas.

Community volunteers, local rescue teams, health workers, Police, Fire & Emergency Services, Civil defence and Disaster-response agencies should have clearly defined roles before an emergency. Schools and public institutions should conduct meaningful drills. Hospitals should have plans for mass casualties, power failure, communication disruption and restricted road access.

Local communities should know where to assemble, whom to contact, how to assist vulnerable people and what to do during the first critical hours. The objective is not to replace professional rescue agencies but to ensure that communities can survive and respond until professional assistance reaches them.

Flood preparedness

Flood preparedness deserves particular attention because flooding remains one of Kashmir’s most consequential recurring hazards.

The Jhelum does not begin at Srinagar. Its behaviour is influenced by rainfall, cloudburst, snowmelt, tributaries, upstream catchments, wetlands and drainage systems. Flood warnings should therefore combine rainfall forecasts, upstream observations, river levels and expected downstream impacts.

The public should not be left to interpret individual rainfall predictions or river-level figures without context.

Wetlands and natural flood-storage areas must also be treated as part of Kashmir’s disaster-protection infrastructure. Their degradation can reduce the landscape’s capacity to absorb and temporarily store excess water, increasing pressure on downstream areas.

Flood management is therefore not simply a matter of strengthening embankments after flooding. It begins with protecting the natural systems that help regulate water.

Preparing for technological and human-induced disasters

Earthquake preparedness and flood management may be the two most important natural-disaster priorities for Kashmir, but the disaster framework cannot stop there.

As infrastructure and economic activity develop, technological and human-induced disasters must also be incorporated into preparedness planning. Chemical leaks, industrial accidents, major fires, explosions, hazardous-material incidents and transportation accidents can produce mass casualties and require specialised responses.

Hazardous-material sites should be mapped and classified. Emergency plans should identify evacuation and shelter-in-place procedures, specialised equipment, trained responders and hospitals capable of managing chemical exposure and mass casualties.

The railway and a new risk landscape

The arrival of modern infrastructure also creates new responsibilities. The railway is a major development for Kashmir, but it introduces a relatively new category of disaster risk.

Railway accidents can include derailments, collisions, fires, tunnel incidents and bridge-related emergencies. A train carrying large numbers of passengers can create a mass-casualty situation requiring coordinated rescue, medical evacuation and traffic management.

Kashmir’s railway infrastructure passes through difficult terrain and includes tunnels, bridges and other structures where access during an emergency may be challenging. Local emergency teams therefore need railway-specific training and equipment, including capabilities for tunnel rescue and firefighting.

Ambulance access, emergency communications and hospital preparedness must be planned for difficult locations. Railway authorities, district administration, Police, Health services, Fire & Emergency Services and Disaster-response agencies should operate through a common emergency protocol and conduct joint exercises.

The railway should be integrated into Kashmir’s disaster-management architecture from the beginning rather than being treated as a separate infrastructure system.

Protecting critical lifelines

A disaster does not become catastrophic only when buildings collapse. It becomes far more dangerous when electricity, water, communications, healthcare, transport and essential supplies fail together.

Kashmir therefore needs continuity plans for its critical lifelines.

Power stations, substations and transmission networks require vulnerability assessments and backup arrangements. Water-supply systems and pumping stations need emergency alternatives. Telecommunications should have independent backup systems so that emergency communication does not depend entirely on commercial networks.

Strategic reserves of fuel, medicines, food and other essential supplies should be geographically distributed, particularly for areas that can become isolated during winter or after landslides.

Emergency planning should also account for sanitation, waste management and heating requirements because these can quickly become secondary public-health emergencies after a major disaster.

The objective should be to ensure that Kashmir can continue functioning even when normal systems are severely disrupted.

From infrastructure inventories to functional resilience

Ultimately, Kashmir needs to move from inventories of infrastructure to assessments of functional resilience.

It is not enough to know how many hospitals, bridges, schools, power stations or government buildings exist. We need to know which of them can continue operating after a major earthquake, flood, landslide, avalanche, cloudburst or prolonged snowfall.

This requires audits, exercises and simulations rather than waiting for disaster to provide the answer.

Recovery, too, must be understood differently. It should not mean simply rebuilding what was destroyed. It should mean rebuilding safer.

If a road repeatedly fails at the same vulnerable location, rebuilding it in exactly the same way is not resilience. If a building collapses because of known structural deficiencies, replacing it without correcting those deficiencies simply recreates the risk.

Every major disaster should therefore be followed by a structured assessment of what failed, what worked and what needs to change. Recovery should incorporate safer engineering, better land-use decisions, improved drainage, stronger infrastructure and lessons from the event.

Building a Kashmir-specific resilience system

Kashmir already has government departments, emergency agencies, Police, Fire & Emergency Services, Health institutions, Civil administration, scientific agencies and communities capable of contributing to disaster management. The challenge is connecting these capacities into one functioning system.

International experience shows that resilience is built through sustained preparedness. Japan has developed a strong earthquake-preparedness culture. Switzerland has extensive systems for managing mountain hazards. The Netherlands has developed sophisticated flood-risk management.

Kashmir does not need to copy any of them. It needs to learn from their principles and build a system suited to its own geography.

The success of disaster management should not be measured only by the number of rescue vehicles, personnel or equipment purchased.

The real test is whether buildings remain standing, whether government hospitals continue functioning, whether emergency communications survive, whether roads remain accessible, whether warnings reach people in time and whether communities can protect themselves during the first critical hours.

Most importantly, the government must know how ready its own infrastructure actually is.

Preparedness should become measurable. Every critical public facility should have a known level of structural safety, operational readiness, backup capacity, emergency access and continuity planning.

Kashmir should not discover its vulnerabilities through the next disaster. It should discover them through audits, drills and simulations while there is still time to correct them.

We cannot choose when the next earthquake, flood, cloudburst, avalanche, landslide or severe windstorm will occur. Nor can we assume that the next emergency will necessarily come from nature; technological and human-induced accidents are now part of the risk landscape of a modernising Kashmir.

But we can choose how vulnerable we are when it arrives.

The greatest achievement of disaster management is not the spectacular rescue after catastrophe.

It is the building that remains standing.

The hospital that continues working.

The road that remains open.

The warning that reaches a family in time.

The Government facility that does not fail when people need it most.

The community that knows what to do and the life that is never lost, because the best disaster is the one that never happens.